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Abstract 
The paper builds a two-stage automobile Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC). The Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) is 
dominant. It integrates Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP). Considering the feature of non-storage and reliability, the 
buyback contract model was built under the stochastic demand. When the logistics capability that LSI wants to order is 
equivalent to FLSP willing to supply, the automobile LSSC reaches equilibrium. Compared with no contract, the buyback 
contract can coordinate the automobile LSSC better. Simulation results indicate that if the reliability increases, the optimal 
logistics capability order quantity, the buyback price and all expected profits decrease. If the penalty cost increases, the buyback 
price, the expected profits of LSI and LSSC decrease, while the optimal logistics capability order quantity and the expected profit 
of FLSP increase. Compared to the penalty cost, the relevant indexes are more sensitive to the reliability.  
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Department of Transportation Engineering, Beijing Institute of Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most challenging tasks in today’s automobile industry is controlling the product quality throughout the 
automobile supply chain (Dhouib, 2014; Pan and Nagi, 2010). The automobile industry is becoming more customer-
oriented and needs faster response times to deal with automobile incidents (Costantino et al., 2012; Khan et al., 2014; 
Rajaguru and Matanda, 2013). The automobile Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC) is a new type of supply 
chain. It is comprised by Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP), Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and 
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customer. Automobile supply chain operations include supply chain logistics, quality management, and information 
exchange (He and Lai, 2012). Efficient supply chain integration may play more critical role for sustainable SCM 
competitiveness (Kim, 2009). Managers must decide how to combine supplier integration and fast supply network 
structure initiatives in order to improve or maximize performance (Danese, 2013; Flynn et al., 2010). 
Contract theory provides important mechanisms that align the objectives of a firm with supply chain’s objective 
(Devangan et al., 2013). Supply chain coordination contracts include common wholesale price contract, buyback 
contract, revenue-sharing contract, quantity flexibility contract and sales rebate contract etc. (Cachon and Kok, 2010; 
Cachon, 2003; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). Buyback contract can coordinate the supply chain well (Devangan et 
al., 2013; Arcelus et al., 2008; Ding and Chen, 2008). For LSSC, a buyback policy helps the LSI mitigate the effect 
of demand uncertainty, thereby encouraging the FLSP to set lower retail prices, place larger orders. 
With the proliferation of product varieties and the increased volatility of the global marketplace, responsiveness 
to customer requests is today a key competitive factor in the business environment (Danese et al., 2013), especially 
in automobile industry. Modern technologies disrupt the existing supply chain (Bauer and Neuhaus, 2013). The 
automobile LSSC is dynamic and instability (Pan and Nagi, 2013; Van Nieuwenhuyse and Vandaele, 2006). A 
reliability evaluation method is developed to evaluate the performance of plants under demand fluctuations (Hsu and 
Li, 2011). It needs a certain reliability to meet its operation (Quigley and Walls, 2007; Sohn and Choi, 2001; Zhou et 
al., 2012). 
However, little research has investigated how the impacts of demand fluctuation are in terms of its magnitude and 
reliability on the whole performance, which is important for the LSI to determine an adjustment strategy. According 
to the previous achievement, this paper is different from the traditional manufacturing supply chain coordination. It 
considers reliability and service. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We give a brief background on 
automobile LSSC. Then we separately build the basic model and buyback contract model. The optimal coordination 
conditions are proposed. In the next section we discuss numerical simulation. Finally we give the results of this 
paper and some future research directions. 
2. Structure of Automobile LSSC 
Automobile logistics includes parts logistics, vehicle logistics and after-sales service logistics. Automobile LSSC 
penetrates the above processes. According to the structure of supply chain, automobile LSSC are composed of FLSP, 
automobile LSI and LSD, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1. The structure of automobile LSSC 
The automobile LSI plays a key role in LSSC (Liu et al., 2013). By integrating the logistics capability of FLSP, it 
provides professional logistics service for customers. Here, customer depends on the position of the chain. It may be 
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the supermarket or farmers market or person. Most of the poor performance of supply chain partners is not due to 
lack of complementary strategic resources, but because of the lack of coordination. 
Different from the product supply chain, the core task of LSSC is purchasing logistics service. Logistics 
capability as a service product, it can’t use inventory to achieve coordination state in the process of logistics service 
supply chain coordination, only through optimization of logistics capability. 
3. Basic Model 
There is a two-stage automobile LSSC composed by one automobile LSI and one FLSP. The LSI can't meet 
logistics capability of the market. It needs to buy logistics capability from the FLSP. At the same time, it raises a 
claim on the reliability of FLSP to ensure the logistics capability. 
The following sets of assumptions and parameters are considered for formulating the basic coordination model. 
3.1. Assumptions  
(i) Information is symmetrical. Both the automobile LSI and FLSP know their own cost structure and revenue 
function and each other’s.  
(ii) The logistics service demand is stochastic. 
(iii) A unit of logistics service demand needs a unit of logistics capability to meet. 
(iv) The logistics capability provided by automobile LSI is unlimited. 
(v) In a service cycle, the automobile LSI can only order logistics capability once. 
3.2. Parameters 
D logistics service demand. Its probability density is f(x), distribution function is F(x) and mean value isP  . 
q logistics capability order quantity. 
RS reliability of FLSP, [0,1].SR
r price of unit logistics capability sold to customer. 
b price of unit logistics capability bought from FLSP. 
p penalty cost of unit logistics capability (when the logistics capability can’t meet the customer demand). 
Ic operating cost of unit logistics capability for automobile LSI. 
1Sc holding cost of unit logistics capability for FLSP. 
2Sc operating cost of unit logistics capability for FLSP. 
cR maintenance cost of unit logistics capability for FLSP to keep reliability. 
S(q) expected logistics capability sales quantity of automobile LSI. 
I(q) expected logistics capability surplus quantity of automobile LSI. 
L(q) expected logistics capability missing quantity of automobile LSI. 
I  expected profit of automobile LSI. 
S  expected profit of FLSP. 
SC  expected profit of LSSC. 
For automobile LSI, the expected profit is  
( ) ( ) ( )    I Ir c S q pL q bq    .                                                                                                             (1) 
Here, 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
f
 ³S q q x f x dx ,  means minimal.  
^ `( ) [ ] [max 0, ] ( )P     L q E D q E D q S q .                                                                                                     (2) 
Then, the expected profit of automobile LSSC is 
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For FLSP, the expected profit is  
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Here, RS is related to q . Then, 
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For automobile LSSC, the expected profit is the sum of automobile LSI and FLSP. According to Eq. (3) and (5), the 
total expected profit is 
1 2 20 0
1 2 2 0
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                                     (6) 
When there is no any contract, automobile LSI determines an optimal logistics capability order quantity to make the 
total expected profit maximum. 
*
0( ) ( ) 0
w         
w
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I Ir c b p r c p F qq
.                                                                                                        (7) 
If the automobile LSSC reaches equilibrium, the logistics capability order quantity function is 
*
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  
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                                                                                                                                        (8) 
Then, the optimal logistics capability order quantity *0q is
* 1
0 ( ).
    
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I
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                                                                                                                                         (9) 
So the expected profits of automobile LSI, FLSP and LSSC are separately 
*
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4. Buyback Contract 
Under buyback contract, FLSP buys the redundant logistics capability at price h  to stimulate the automobile LSI 
to order more logistics capability, h b . To keep the benefit of automobile LSI,   I Ic c b r . At the same time, 
to keep the benefit of FLSP, 1 2   S S S Rc c R c b r .
The expected profit of automobile LSI is  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )     I Ir c S q pL q bq hI q .                                                                                                              (13) 
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)(qI  is expected logistics capability surplus quantity.   
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Similarly,  
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The expected profit of LSSC is the same to Eq. (6). 
In the case of decentralized decision making, automobile LSI determines logistics capability order quantity. If LSI 
consults with FLSP, the logistics capability that LSI wants to order is equivalent to FLSP willing to supply. It is 
called competitive alliance coordination. In this strategy, information are fully shared between members. 
    For automobile LSI, the optimal logistics capability order quantity IBCq
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For FLSP, the optimal logistics capability order quantity SBCq
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We assume  I SBC BCq q . Then, the optimal buy back price BCh  can be got.  
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So, the expected profits of automobile LSI, FLSP and LSSC are separately 
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5. Numerical Simulation 
The automobile LSI faces demand D which obeys uniform distribution ),0( m . Here, 1400 m , 600 r ,
105 Ic , 100 p , 320 b , 1 55 Sc , 2 78 Sc , 0.7 SR , 55 Rc . By MATLAB7.0 programming model, we can 
get the results under buyback contract, as shown in Table 1. Then, we make RS change from 0.5 to 0.8 and p
change from 85 to 120. They influence the optimal logistics capability order quantity, the buyback price, the 
expected profits of automobile LSI, FLSP and LSSC differently, as shown in Fig. 2 to 3 and Table 2 to Table 4. 
From Tab.1 we can see that the optimal logistics capability order quantity increases under the buyback contract 
contrast to no contract. For the whole LSSC, the expected profit increases. It is benefit for the members cooperative 
relationship. 
From Fig.2 we can see that if RS enlarges, q  reduces. But if p increases, q  increases. RS influences more than 
p on q . It means when RS increases, FLSP will decrease h  to reduce cost. It makes LSI order less logistics 
330   Meiling He et al. /  Procedia Engineering  137 ( 2016 )  325 – 333 
capability. When p increases, LSI will order more logistics capability to reduce penalty cost. 
From Fig.3 we can see that if RS increases, h  decreases; if p increases, h  decreases too. It means when RS
increases, FLSP will  increase cost and reduce h . When p increases, automobile LSI will order more logistics 
capability. But FLSP will reduce h  to  control the cost. 
From Tab.2 we can see that if RS increases, LSI’s expected profit S I  decreases; if p increases, S I  decreases too. 
It means that when RS increases, FLSP will reduce h . Then the expected profit of LSI will decrease. When p
increases, LSI will pay more cost, and it makes LSI’s expected profit decreases.
From Tab.3 we can see that if RS increases, FLSP’s expected profit S S  decreases; if p increases, S S  increases. It 
means that when RS increases, FLSP will increase reliability cost and the expected profit will decrease. When 
p increases, LSI will order more logistics capability. Then the expected profit of FLSP increases.
From Tab.4 we can see that if SR  increases, LSSC’s expected profit S
SC  decreases; if p increases, S SC
decreases too. From the point of the slope, S SC  is more sensitive to RS changes than p .
Table 1. The comparison between the results of the buyback contract and no contract 
q h S I S S S SC
No contract 647 —— 18970.6 107751.6 126722.2
Buyback 1147 259.3 87686.2 85150.5 172836.7
Fig.2. The influence on the optimal logistics capability order quantity q  with the changes in reliability RS and penalty cost p
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Fig.3. The influence on the buyback price h  with the changes in RS and p
Table 2. The influence on automobile LSI’s expected profit S I  with the changes in RS and p
SR
p      S I          
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 
85 92589.6 91592.6 90595.6 89598.6 88601.6 87604.6 86607.6 
90 92315.1 91308.9 90302.8 89296.6 88290.4 87284.3 86278.1 
95 92045.9 91030.8 90015.6 89000.5 87985.4 86970.2 85955.1 
100 91781.9 90758.0 89734.0 88710.1 87686.2 86662.2 85638.3 
105 91523.0 90490.4 89457.9 88425.3 87392.7 86360.2 85327.6 
110 91269.0 90227.9 89186.9 88145.9 87104.8 86063.8 85022.8 
115 91019.7 89970.4 88921.1 87871.7 86822.4 85773.0 84723.7 
120 90775.1 89717.6 88660.1 87602.7 86545.2 85487.7 84430.2 
Table 3. The influence on FLSP’s expected profit S S  with the changes in RS and p
SR
p     S S
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 
85 93301.1 91091.4 88902.8 86735.2 84588.8 82463.4 80359.2 
90 93482.1 91275.2 89089.2 86924.0 84779.7 82656.3 80553.8 
95 93659.5 91455.4 89271.9 87109.1 84966.9 82845.5 80744.7 
100 93833.5 91632.0 89451.1 87290.6 85150.5 83031.0 80931.9 
105 94004.2 91805.4 89626.8 87468.6 85330.6 83212.9 81115.5 
110 94171.6 91975.4 89799.2 87643.2 85507.3 83391.4 81295.6 
115 94335.9 92142.2 89968.4 87814.6 85680.6 83566.5 81472.4 
120 94497.1 92305.9 90134.5 87982.7 85850.7 83738.4 81645.8 
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Table 4. The influence on automobile LSSC’s expected profit S SC  with the changes in RS and p
SR
p        S SC
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 
85 185890.8 182684.1 179498.4 176333.9 173190.4 170068.0 166966.7 
90 185797.2 182584.1 179391.9 176220.6 173070.2 169940.6 166832.0 
95 185705.4 182486.1 179287.5 176109.6 172952.3 169815.7 166699.8 
100 185615.4 182390.0 179185.1 176000.7 172836.7 169693.2 166570.2 
105 185527.2 182295.8 179084.7 175893.9 172723.3 169573.1 166443.1 
110 185440.6 182203.3 178986.1 175789.1 172612.1 169455.2 166318.4 
115 185355.6 182112.6 178889.5 175686.3 172503.0 169339.6 166196.1 
120 185272.2 182023.5 178794.6 175585.4 172395.9 169226.1 166076.0 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
We study on the capability coordination of automobile LSSC under buyback contract. For automobile LSI and 
FLSP, they decide the optimal logistics capability order quantities separately based on their maximum profits. When 
both the order quantities are equivalent, the automobile LSSC reaches an optimal coordination state. Then the 
numerical simulation verifies the correctness of the model. We discuss different results when  RS and  p changes. 
The results are useful to automobile LSSC member’s profits distribution. 
In future research, we will consider other conditions. For example, in numerical simulation, we just assume D
obeys uniform distribution. However, Poisson distribution or Normal distribution is more complicated. They are 
more close to actual operation. 
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